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Abstract—The blockchain is a key technology that has been
adopted in many application areas to increase security and
reliability and to avoid the need for a central trusted authority.
One of its essential underlying foundations are smart contracts,
which are executable programs for managing data or assets
on the blockchain. It is crucial that smart contracts are tested
thoroughly due to their immutable nature and since even small
bugs can lead to huge monetary losses. However, it is not enough
to just test smart contracts, it is also important to ensure the
quality and completeness of the tests. Hence, we introduce new
smart contract specific mutation operators as well as a novel
killing condition that is able to detect a deviation in the gas
consumptions, i.e., in the monetary value that is required to
perform transactions. Moreover, we establish a baseline for
mutation testing of smart contracts by applying our method to
a replay test suite and by testing about a thousand contracts.
Index Terms—Mutation testing, Ethereum, Smart contracts,
Gas limit as a killing criterion, Modifier issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart contracts are programs designed to express business
logic for managing the data or assets on a blockchain system.
They are becoming increasing popular with the rise of the
blockchain in various disciplines. Although smart contracts
already exist for some years, they still suffer from major
security vulnerabilities, which can often lead to huge monetary
losses. For example, it has been shown that simple coding
mistakes can be exploited by attackers, which led to a loss of
millions of dollars [1]. Hence, it is important to make sure that
smart contracts do not contain such vulnerabilities. However,
detecting known vulnerabilities as it was often done in the
past [18] is only one aspect of checking the quality of smart
contracts. It is also important to ensure they do not suffer from
semantic errors that could result in unwanted behaviour, like
a wrong calculation of a monetary value. The most important
method for finding both vulnerabilities and semantic errors is
testing. Testing smart contracts is even more important than
testing regular programs, since their source is often publicly
available, which makes them an easy target, and updating them
is cumbersome due to their immutable nature. Moreover, it is
critical to ensure the quality of the tests. There are a few simple
quality metrics, like code coverage, i.e., the percentage of the
source code that is executed by a test, but they are not able
to measure the error detection capability of tests. A technique
that can do this measurement is mutation testing, which injects
faults into a program to check the ability of the tests to detect
these faults.
In this paper, we discuss a mutation testing approach for
Solidity1 smart contracts that can check the ability of a test to
reveal common smart contract faults. Solidity is a JavaScript
like language with a number of special features to interact with
the underlying Ethereum blockchain. The blockchain serves
to store code and data, and the blockchain is managed by the
owners of the Ethereum peer-to-peer network.
We introduce smart contract specific mutations that inject
common mistakes that are made by smart contract developers.
An example is a forgotten or wrong function modifier [12]. A
modifier can express conditions that have to be fulfilled for the
execution of a function, e.g., that the caller of the function is
the owner of the contract. Since modifiers are often concerned
with access control, it can have catastrophic effects when one
is missing, e.g., important management functions of a smart
contract can become publicly available. Hence, we introduce
a mutation that replaces or deletes modifiers in order to check
the ability of the tests to reveal this mistake.
Another smart contract specific aspect is the gas consump-
tion of transactions. Everything on Ethereum costs some units
of gas [34]. For example, executing an ADD bytecode costs
3 gas. Storing a byte costs 4 or 68 gas, depending on the
value of the byte (zero or non-zero). The price of gas in Ether
varies widely2, and the market determines the exchange rate of
Ether. The cost of a transaction can be anything from less than
a cent to several US$. Executing smart contracts is therefore
not just a matter of executing the code with the right semantics
but also of cost control. Therefore, all transactions have a gas
limit to make sure that the cost is managed. Executing smart
contracts with a gas limit is comparable to executing code on
a real time system with a deadline [22]. This opens up new
possibilities for killing mutants, over and above the standard
killing conditions.
Similar to detecting mutants on real-time systems with
a different timing behaviour, we introduce a novel killing
condition based on the gas consumption, i.e., we measure
the gas consumption of tested transactions to find deviations
to reference executions of these transactions. This allows us
to kill mutants that consume a significantly greater amount
of gas. Moreover, it can help to rule out some mutants that
seem to have an equivalent functional behaviour, but that show
different gas consumption.
1https://solidity.readthedocs.io/
2https://etherscan.io/chart/gasprice
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Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our method
at scale by checking the quality of replay tests [9] that
are automatically produced from historic transaction data on
the blockchain. The achieved mutation score can serve as a
baseline for testing other, more sophisticated testing methods.
Our contributions are:
• We introduce novel mutation operators for Solidity, which
are based on common programming mistakes, especially
mistakes concerning missing access control.
• The gas limit of smart contract transactions is used as a
novel killing condition. This improves the mutation score
significantly.
• The approach is evaluated using a large sample of verified
smart contracts downloaded from Etherscan with match-
ing replay tests in order to establish a baseline for other
testing methods.
II. BACKGROUND
Mutation testing [15], [26], [27] is an evaluation technique
for assessing the quality of a set of test cases (i.e., a test suite).
It works by introducing faults into a system via source code
mutation and by analysing the ability of the test suite to detect
these faults. The idea is that the mutation should simulate
common errors that a developer might make by mistake.
Hence, when a test suite is able to find such artificial faults, it
should also find real ones that can occur through programming
mistakes. The quality of the test suite can be measured by the
mutation score, which is calculated by dividing the number of
detected (or killed) mutants by the total number of mutants.
Ideally this score should be close to one.
Developers of smart contracts are likely to make some mis-
takes with standard language features, but because Ethereum
is relatively young, they are more likely to confuse Solidity
specific features. For example, Solidity offers two different
types of assertions: require(.) is used to check external
consistency, and assert(.) is used to check internal consis-
tency. Both terminate the contract but with a different status
that might confuse the distributed applications (DApp) that
build upon the contract.
Developers also have trouble with the qualifiers that Solidity
offers, such as external (for functions that can be called
from other contracts and via transactions, but not internally),
public (for functions that can either be called internally or
via transactions), internal (for functions that can only be
accessed internally), and private (for functions that are only
visible in the contract they are defined in). There are more
qualifiers and other subtle differences, which make it even
harder to use the correct qualifier.
Finally, the addresses of contracts and externally owned
accounts play such an important role in smart contracts that
there are several ways of specifying addresses that may
confuse the developer. For example, address(this) is the
address of the current contract, which can also be accessed by
a 40 hex digit address. msg.sender is the address of the
sender of a message, and tx.origin is the address of the
externally owned account that sent a transaction. They are the
same for a short call chain but not for a longer call chain.
There are several papers that discuss typical mistakes of
smart contract developers, including the security implications
of confusing one notation for another [1]. We will not pursue
this further and instead discuss a number of examples of
mutations inspired by potential mistakes in subsection II-A.
To specify how faults should be injected, there are mutation
operators [24] which are basically rules that describe the
changes that should be made for a mutant. For example, a
mutation operator might state that a constant integer should
be replaced by another random integer.
Although mutation testing is an old technique, it has still
open challenges, like the equivalent mutant problem, which
occurs when a mutation does not change the original program,
e.g., when a fault is injected in dead code. There are methods
that try to detect or avoid equivalent mutants [8], [11], [23],
[25], but it is still not possible to get rid of all of them.
Hence, this limits the usability of mutation testing, since a
high manual effort is required to identify equivalent mutants.
Every transaction on Ethereum costs gas. This creates an op-
portunity for mutation testing. For example, if two fragments
of code are functionally equivalent but one costs more gas
than the other, one could argue that they are not semantically
equivalent. However, the tools that are currently available for
estimating the amount of gas that a transaction needs are
inaccurate [21]. Therefore, we suggest the question of how to
use gas cost to determine functional equivalence of mutants
as potential future work. We will focus here on leveraging gas
consumption when deciding whether a mutant is killed.
Related approaches to our work have already applied mu-
tation testing for domain specific languages or frameworks.
For example, Zhu and Zaidman [37] presented a mutation
analysis for the general purpose input output (GPIO) interface
of IoT devices. Can˜izares et al. [2] showed a mutation testing
approach for a simulation framework for cloud and high
performance computing environments.
There is also related work that introduces special mutation
operators for specific languages features. For example, Le et
al. [19] introduced dedicated mutation operators for functional
programming idioms to enable an effective mutation analysis
of functional programming languages. Similarly, there are also
special mutation operators for WS-BPEL 2.0 [4].
Moreover, there are related approaches that introduced spe-
cial mutation operators concerning non-functional properties,
like energy usage or timing. Jabbarvand and Malek [14] intro-
duced a mutation testing framework for Android that is able
to detect bugs that result in a high energy consumption. They
developed special energy-aware mutation operators that can
create these energy bugs. A similar approach with mutation
operators for time was presented by Nilsson et al. [22]. Their
proposed method for real time systems applies mutations that
change the timing behaviour of tasks and their aim was to
produce tests that are able to identify these timing differences.
Both energy consumption and timing can be seen as related
to the gas consumption of smart contract transactions. In the
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same way a mutant can be killed based on a run time or
energy deviation; it is also possible to kill a mutant based on
a difference in the gas usage.
There are related papers that already introduced mutation
testing for Solidity. Wu et al. [35] have implemented similar
mutation operators and tested four DApps. The difference to
our approach is that their mutations do not consider access
control faults and they are not concerned with inspecting
the gas usage. Honig et al. [12] do take access control into
account, but not the gas limit. The evaluation of both papers
is also limited to 4 respectively 2 contracts. Fu [5] et al.
also introduced a smart contract mutation approach, but for
testing implementations of the Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM) implementations and not smart contracts. There are
two GitHub repositories with related tools. Eth-mutants3 im-
plements just one mutation operator and UniversalMutator4
describes a generic mutation tool [7] with set of operators for
Solidity. These tools have not been evaluated.
The research question that follows from the analysis of the
background is
How efficient are the standard mutation operators
as compared to Solidity specific operators?
To break this question down into its more manageable sub
questions we present a case study in mutation testing of a
sample smart contract first, and then list the sub questions.
A. A case study in mutation: Vitaluck
As a case study we use a lottery contract called Vitaluck [3].
The source of the contract can be browsed on Etherscan5.
It contains a main method called Play and a number of
management methods. The main method contains the core of
the business logic of the lottery. Each call to Play draws a
random number in the range 1 to 1000 using the time stamp of
the current block as a source of entropy. If the random number
is greater than 900, the player wins the jackpot. A percentage
of each bet is paid to the owner of the contract.
Vitaluck is a relatively short contract (139 lines of source
code excluding comments). It has not been used extensively;
there are only 27 historic transactions that can also be browsed
on Etherscan. The first transaction deploys the contract. The
remaining historic transactions are all calls to the Play
method. None of management methods of the contract are ever
called by the historic transactions on the blockchain. However,
the Play method is responsible for the majority of the code
and provides ample opportunities for using standard mutation
operators, as well as Solidity specific operators.
To motivate our choice for mutation operators we use a
number of examples. Each example is labelled in italic font
with the mutation operator and a brief description of the
purpose of the operator. Moreover, we highlight some common
known vulnerabilities, as described in the smart contract
weakness classification (SWC) registry [31], which can be
3https://github.com/federicobond/eth-mutants
4https://github.com/agroce/universalmutator
5https://etherscan.io/address/0xef7c7254c290df3d167182356255cdfd8d3b400b
simulated with our mutation operators. Table II summarises
the operators.
AOR - Assignment Operator Replacement Since Vitaluck is
a lottery, any mutation to the code that manages the jackpot
has a high likelihood of causing a fault in the contract. The
first sample mutation below (at line 123 of the Vitaluck source,
using an output format inspired by the Unix diff command)
requires the owner of the lottery to pay the player instead
of the other way around. Such a fault is also described as
a vulnerability by the SWC regisry: SWC-129 Typographical
Error6.
< currentJackpot = currentJackpot - MsgValue10Percent;
> currentJackpot = currentJackpot + MsgValue10Percent;
LR I - Literal Integer replacement The second sam-
ple mutation (line 149) changes 900 to 1. The range of
_finalRandomNumber is 1 to 1000. If the condition in
the if statement is true, the jackpot will be paid out, which
in the original code happens on average 10% of the time. After
the mutation, the jackpot will be paid out 99.9% of the time.
< if(_finalRandomNumber >= 900) {
> if(_finalRandomNumber >= 1 ) {
ITSCR - Identifier with same Type, Scope, and Constancy
Replacement The third sample mutation (line 182) replaces
the address of the winner of the jackpot by a hard coded
address that belongs to the owner (the CFO) of the contract.
This means that the jackpot will never be paid out to a
player, but always to the CFO. Depending on which address
(or identifier) is replaced, the operator can also introduce
the vulnerability SWC-105 Unprotected Ether Withdrawal,
e.g., when the name of the constructor is replaced, it will
become publicly available. Introducing such vulnerabilities
into a contract allows us to assess if a test suite is able to
find them, and hence it can support the creation of thorough
tests.
< currentWinningAddress.transfer(JackpotWon);
> cfoAddress.transfer(JackpotWon);
MORD* - Modifier Replacement or Deletion The fourth
sample mutation (line 257) deletes the modifier onlyCeo
from the method that installs the address of a new CEO.
This allows anyone to set the pay-out address to his own,
rather than just the CEO. This behaviour also corresponds to
the vulnerability SWC-105, which can occur when the access
control for functions is insufficient. The operator can further
cause vulnerabilities, like the SWC-106 Unprotected SELF-
DESTRUCT Instruction, or SWC-123 Requirement Violation.
< function modifyCeo(address _newCeo) public onlyCeo {
> function modifyCeo(address _newCeo) public {
QRD* - Qualifier for storage local or state mutability
Replacement or Deletion The fifth sample mutation (line
78) prevents anyone from playing the lottery, as removing
the qualifier payable blocks any transfer of money to the
contract. It can also change the accessibility of functions,
6https://swcregistry.io/docs/SWC-129
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which may reveal important initialization functions (SWC-100
Function Default Visibility).
< function Play() public payable {
> function Play() public {
LR A* - Literal Address replacement The sixth sample
mutation (line 30) changes the hard coded address of the
CFO to the address of the contract itself. Assuming that CFO
also controls the address of the contract, this should not be a
problem for the lottery. However, it can also lead to a known
authorization vulnerability as described by SWC-115, which
can occur when the variable for the transaction origin tx.origin
is used for authorization checks.
< address cfoAddress = 0xFFcf8FDEE72ac11b5c5...;
> address cfoAddress = address(this) ;
RAR* - R-Value Address Replacement The seventh sample
mutation (line 191) prevents the contract from paying out
winnings. The RAR* operator replaces an R-Value (i.e., a value
on the right hand side of an assignment operator). This can
also lead to the same authorization vulnerability as for the
LR A* operator.
< currentWinningAddress = address(this);
> currentWinningAddress = address(0);
LR B - Literal Boolean Replacement The final sample
mutation (line 163) replaces the Boolean parameter of the
NewPlay event.
< NewPlay(msg.sender, _finalRandomNumber, false);
> NewPlay(msg.sender, _finalRandomNumber, true );
This mutant returns incorrect information to the DApp. It
has also been included because the changes to the amount of
gas used during the deployment of the contract are relatively
easy to explain. The cost of storing the bytecode of a contract
depends not only on the size of the bytecode but also the values
of the bytes to be stored. Storing a zero byte costs 4 gas units
and storing a non-zero byte costs 68 gas. Since false is
represented as 0 and true as a 1, we expect the amount of
gas needed for deploying the mutant to increase by 64. Indeed,
the original requires 1410422 gas, and the mutant requires
1410486 gas, which differ by 64. Since all other factors that
cost gas involved in the deployment, such as the size of the
code, and the bytecodes executed for deployment are the same
for the mutant as for the original, the change of a 0 to a 1 byte
accounts for the entire difference in gas usage between original
and mutant. We can explore the deployment transaction of
Vitaluck on the blockchain7. The gas limit turns out to be
exactly enough to deploy the contract, i.e., 1410422 gas. With
the same limit, the mutant above would run out of gas during
deployment, and it should therefore be killed by the test.
The code structure and composition of a contract determines
which opportunities there are for mutations. Vitaluck has 387
suitable program fragments, which can be broken down into
statements, expressions etc. as shown in Table I. There are
7https://etherscan.io/tx/0x5f51cec3233e28959a2f39a7eec8bddc8178747e9a6b3991d
b0c02c6439fcc5b
only 27 qualifiers (6%) and 4 modifier invocations. So most
opportunities for mutations fit the standard operators, and few
fit the Solidity specific operators.
TABLE I
MUTATION OPPORTUNITIES IN VITALUCK
# Code fragment # Code fragment
28 Assignment 13 Member access
30 Binary operation 4 Modifier invocation
49 Expression statement 27 Qualifier
2 Function call 6 Return
153 Identifier 7 Unary operation
23 Literal 48 Variable declaration
B. Sub questions
Based on the Vitaluck case study we can now formulate a
number of subsidiary research questions.
a) Discarding stillborn mutants: We created a simple
tool (ContractMut) that makes maximum use of existing
state-of-the-art tools, such as the Truffle framework8 and the
Solidity compiler. In particular, the tool relies heavily on the
Solidity compiler to read the source file and to generate the
abstract syntax tree (AST). This approach has the advantages
that the amount of bespoke tooling to be built is limited. The
disadvantage is that the compiler has much more information
than it exposes via the AST. The mutation tool does not have
semantic information about the original code or the mutant as
it works on the AST generated by the Solidity compiler. This
means that some mutants are generated that do not compile,
for example:
• When replacing * by - in an expression such as
1 * 9 / 10000000000000000000, an error oc-
curs because a rational constant cannot be subtracted from
an integer.
• If + mutates into - in an expression such as
new bytes(1+65), an error occurs because it is not
possible to allocate a negative amount of storage.
• If in a declaration such as a=b+1, b is mutated to a, a
cyclic dependency is created that draws an error.
This raises the sub question: To what extent does the tool
generate stillborn mutants?
b) Discarding duplicate and equivalent mutants: Dupli-
cate and equivalent mutants distort the mutation score. The
next sub question is therefore: How to detect duplicate and
equivalent mutants?
c) Mutation score: The purpose of generating mutants is
to assess the quality of a test. If too few mutants are killed
by a test, the usual course of action is to develop more tests.
This is labour intensive. However, for a smart contract like
Vitaluck that has already been deployed on the blockchain,
all historic transactions are available and can be decompiled
into a test. A test then consists of replaying the sequence of
historic transactions. We can control the size of the test by
8https://www.trufflesuite.com
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varying the number of transactions executed by the mutant.
As the size of the test increases, we expect the mutation score
to increase. Unfortunately, most historic transactions execute
the same method calls, so the increase in mutation score should
tail of rapidly. The sub question then is: What is the relation
between the mutation score and the length of the test?
d) Efficiency of the mutation operators: We follow the
competent programmer hypothesis [36] by creating a subtle
variant of a program fragment that could have been created
by a developer by mistake. The sub question is: What is the
relative success of standard mutation operators as compared
Solidity specific operators?
e) Using outputs in a mutant killing condition: To deter-
mine whether a mutant is killed, a test compares the output
of the original to the output of the mutant and kills the
mutant if there are differences. The next sub question is: Which
observable outputs can be used in the killing condition?
f) Using gas in a mutant killing condition: The amount
of gas used by a transaction depends on the number and type
of the EVM instructions executed, the amount and type of data
stored, and the amount of data sent to and received from the
transaction [34]. Gas costs real money. Therefore, a prudent
developer will try to limit the amount of gas available to a
transaction. There are standard tools for this that use Worst
Case Execution Time (WCET) estimation techniques [33]. The
cautious developer uses these to estimate a limit bound on the
amount of gas needed. A tight limit on the amount of gas
reduces the risk of having to pay too much for a transaction.
However, if the limit is too tight, some method calls may fail
unexpectedly. Estimating the gas limit is a non-trivial problem.
For example, even though EVM bytecodes are deterministic,
a transaction may take inputs from a variety of sources,
including the unpredictable time stamp of the current block.
This makes it challenging to predict the gas limit. A prudent
developer therefore might add at least a safety margin to ensure
that a transaction will not run out of gas unexpectedly. This
raises the following sub question: To what extent is killing
mutants based on exceeding the gas limit efficient?
III. METHOD
This section describes an experiment in mutation testing of
smart contracts on Ethereum. We have tried the simplest thing
first to set a baseline. The experiments have been conducted
on a uniform random sample of 1,120 smart contracts with
tests that can be downloaded from Truffle-tests-for-free9. We
removed 157 contracts from the set because either they were
non-deterministic or they did not have a test with 50 trans-
actions. These 963 contracts are representative for the entire
collection of 50,000+ verified smart contracts on Etherscan [9],
and the sample is relatively large [27]. The tests are replay
tests and relatively short. The average bytecode coverage is
51.4% [9]. Our results are therefore a baseline.
9https://github.com/pieterhartel/Truffle-tests-for-free
A test for a contract begins by compiling and re-deploying
the contract on a pristine blockchain. We use the Truffle
framework for this with the exact same time stamps and
transaction parameters as the historic deployment on the public
Ethereum blockchain. All mainnet addresses are replaced by
testnet addresses and all externally owned accounts have a
generous balance. After re-deployment, the first 50 historic
transactions are re-played, also with the historic time stamps
and transaction parameters [9]. After each transaction all pure
methods of a contract are called, with fuzzed parameters.
This is intended to simulate any actions by a Distributed
Application (DApp) built on top of the contract.
To detect whether a mutant is killed, we compare the
outputs of a transaction generated by the original contract to
the outputs of the corresponding transaction generated by the
mutant contract. We compare only observable outputs of a
transaction, which means that we consider only strong mutants
that propagate faults to the outputs.
a) Discarding stillborn mutants: ContractMut uses the
Solidity compiler to compile all the mutants it generates. If
the compilation fails, the mutant is discarded. Smart contracts
are usually relatively small, hence the time wasted on failed
compilations is limited.
b) Discarding duplicate and equivalent mutants: Con-
tractMut implements the trivially equivalent mutant detection
method [17] to discarded duplicate and equivalent mutants.
Each new mutant is compiled and the bytecode of the new
mutant is compared to the bytecode of the original and the
bytecode of all previously generated mutants. If there is a
match, the new mutant is discarded.
c) Mutation score: Since the tests are machine generated,
they are consistent in the sense that all sample contracts are
tested by making 50 transactions. The advantage of using
machine-generated tests is that this scales well to large num-
bers of contracts. The disadvantage is that the tests are not
necessarily representative for handcrafted tests. For example,
the bytecode coverage of the tests varies considerably, from
6% to 98% [9].
d) Efficiency of the mutation operators: ContractMut im-
plements the essence of the Mothra set [16]. This is considered
the minimum standard for mutation testing [27]. To this we
added four Solidity specific mutation operators. Table II lists
the operators in alphabetical order. The first column of the
table indicates the correspondence with the Mothra operators.
The operators marked with an asterisk are Solidity specific.
The next two columns give the name of the operator, and a
description. The next two columns give an example of use of
the operator. The only operators that do not have a Mothra
correspondence are the Solidity specific operators. Similarly,
the Fortran specific operators from Mothra (DER, DSA, GLR)
have not been implemented. We have also omitted the array
operators (AARC, ACR, ASR, CAR, CNR, SAR) and absolute
value insertion (ABS) because arrays are relatively rare and
signed integers are extremely rare in smart contracts. The last
column shows the relation of the operators to known vulner-
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TABLE II
MUTATION OPERATORS FOR SOLIDITY PROGRAMS. OPERATORS MARKED WITH AN ASTERISK ARE SOLIDITY SPECIFIC.
Mothra ContractMut Description Examples SWC ID
operator operator Replace this: by this:
AOR/LCE/ROR AOR Assignment Operator Replacement = += SWC-129
AOR/LCR/ROR BOR Binary Operator Replacement + - SWC-129
&& || SWC-129
SDL ESD Expression Statement Deletion a++ true
SVR ITSCR Identifier with same Type, Scope, assert require SWC-105,
and Constancy Replacement balance[t0] balance[from] SWC-106
emit Transfer(acc) emit Approval(acc)
RSR JSRD Jump Statement Replacement or Deletion break continue
- LR A* Literal Address Replacement 0x0xef7...b400b msg.sender SWC-115
CRP/CSR/SCR/SRC LR B Literal Boolean Replacement true false
CRP/CSR/SCR/SRC LR I Literal Integer Replacement 10 11
CRP/CSR/SCR/SRC LR S Literal String Replacement ’ETH’ ’’
- MORD* Modified Replacement or Deletion onlyCeo SWC-105,
SWC-106,
SWC-123
- QRD* Qualifier for storage local or state public private SWC-100,
mutability Replacement or Deletion payable SWC-108
bytes memory x bytes storage x
- RAR* R-Value Address Replacement msg.sender tx.origin SWC-115
AOR/LCR/ROR UORD Unary Operator Replacement or Deletion ++ -- SWC-129
SVR VDTSCS Variable Declaration with same Type add(uint a,uint b) add(uint b,uint a)
Scope and Constancy Swap
abilities based on the smart contract weakness classification
(SWC) registry [31].
Each node in the AST represents a program fragment
that could in principle be mutated. Therefore, all relevant
AST nodes are collected in a candidate list. This includes
simple statements, literals, identifiers, function parameters, and
operators. Compound statements, methods and even entire
contracts could also be included in the candidate list, but
we assume that mutations to such larger program fragments
are not consistent with the competent programmer hypothesis.
Once the candidate list has been built, the tool repeatedly
selects a mutation candidate uniformly at random from the
list [20] and applies the appropriate mutation operator from
Table II.
e) Using outputs in a mutant killing condition: To deter-
mine whether a mutant is killed the outputs of the original
contract are compared to the outputs of the mutant while
executing each transaction of the test. TxEvMeth compares all
observable outputs of a transaction as follows:
• Tx compares the transaction status (i.e., success, failure,
or out of gas).
• Ev compares all outputs of all events emitted by a
transaction.
• Meth compares all outputs of all pure methods called by
the DApp simulation after each transaction.
The combination TxEvMeth corresponds to the standard mu-
tant killing condition.
f) Using gas in a mutant killing condition: Every historic
transaction on the blockchain has a limit on the amount
of gas used. To assess how tight these limits are, we have
analysed the statistics of all N = 50, 930 historic transactions
TABLE III
GAS USED BY THE HISTORIC TRANSACTION AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE
HISTORIC GAS LIMIT VERSUS GAS USED BY THE REPLAYED TRANSACTION
AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE CALCULATED GAS LIMIT.
Historic Replay
% gas used of limit (count) (%) (count) (%)
≥ 0% & < 20% 5062 11.3% 4292 12.3%
≥ 20% & < 40% 6893 15.4% 5439 15.6%
≥ 40% & < 60% 6405 14.3% 4314 12.4%
≥ 60% & < 80% 9847 21.9% 7522 21.6%
≥ 80% & < 100% 9564 21.3% 9119 26.2%
= 100% 7127 15.9% 4171 12.0%
Tx success 44898 100.0% 34857 100.0%
Tx failed 6032 16073
Total Tx 50930 50930
Minimum gas limit 21000 21000
Maximum gas limit 8000029 15279099
Mean gas limit 397212 416350
Std. deviation gas limit 1002691 1071615
downloaded from Truffle-tests-for-free. Columns two and three
of Table III show that 15.9% of the sample uses exactly the
gas limit, and 11.3% uses less than 20% of the gas limit. The
minimum gas limit is 21,000 and the maximum is 8,000,029,
which represents a large range. The standard deviation is
also relatively large (1,002,691). Hence, there is considerable
variance in how developers estimate the limit on transactions,
and it is probably fair to say that the limits are not tight.
Let us assume that the limit as provided by a historic
transaction, glh , is a hard limit on the amount of gas that the
developer is prepared to pay. Then, in principle we can use
this limit to kill all mutants executing the same transaction
that exceed the limit. However, since we are replaying each
historic transaction on the Truffle framework, the amount of
gas used by replaying the transaction may be slightly different.
To compensate for this, we propose to calculate the gas limit
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on replaying a transaction, glr , as the maximum of the gas
limit of the historic transaction, and the scaled gas limit of
the historic transaction. The scaling applied is the ratio of
gur , the gas used by the replay, and guh , the gas used by the
historic transaction:
glr = max (glh,
gur
guh
glh)
The last two columns of Table III show the statistics of glr
calculated according to the formula above. The distribution is
similar to that of the gas used by the historic transaction, but
there is more variance. The max operation in particular makes
the limit on the gas used by the replay less tight than the gas
limit on the historic transaction. In the next section, we will
investigate to what extent glr is efficient as a killing condition.
We will call this the Limit condition, and apply it on its own,
and in combination with TxEvMeth as TxEvMethLimit.
IV. RESULTS
This section describes the results of our experiment in
mutation testing of smart contracts on Ethereum. For each
smart contract with a test we tried to generate exactly 50
non-equivalent mutants. Since each attempt requires a call
to the Solidity compiler, we set an upper limit of 1,000
on the number of attempts to generate a mutant. For 18
smart contracts fewer than 50 non-equivalent mutants were
generated, but for the remaining 98.3% of the contracts we
obtained 50 non-equivalent mutants. In total, we generated
71,314 mutants, of which 47,870 were non-equivalent. For
each contract we then executed the tests against all non-
equivalent mutants on the Truffle framework. We ran 47,870
× 50 = 2,393,500 transactions, which took over a week to
run on 14 Linux virtual machines (Hardware: Intel Xeon dual
core, 2.4 GHZ, with 16GB RAM).
a) Discarding stillborn mutants: Of the generated 71,314
mutants, 11,252 (15.8%) could not be compiled. As expected
the QRD* operator generates the most stillborn mutants:
63.3% of the mutants with this operator did not compile.
We take this as an indication that using the limited amount
of semantic information available in the Solidity AST is an
acceptable approach towards building a baseline mutation tool.
The percentage of stillborn mutants can be reduced to zero if
the full power of various semantics analyses of the compiler
could be leveraged, but the cost of building such a mutation
tool just to reduce a relatively small percentage of failed
compilations alone would not be justifiable.
b) Discarding duplicate and equivalent mutants: Of the
71,314 generated mutants, 12,192 (17.1%) were equivalent
to the original or a duplicate of another mutant. The trivial
equivalent detection method [17] that we used is therefore
reasonably effective, especially since often about 40–45% of
the mutants can be equivalent [8], [30].
c) Mutation score: Figure 1 shows how the mutation
score increases with the test size. The error bars for a 95%
confidence interval are small. The standard mutant killing
condition TxEvMeth has most success early on, whereas the
success of the Limit condition increases more gradually. This
Fig. 1. Percentage of non-equivalent mutants killed as a function of the length
of the test. The error bars correspond to a confidence interval of 95%.
difference can be explained as follows. All tests execute the
constructor method in transaction 0 and one regular method
in transaction 1. A relatively large fraction of the tests only
execute these two methods (see below for details), hence most
of the opportunity for killing a mutant on regular outputs
occurs during transactions 0 and 1.
Since in general size matters [13], we fixed the size of the
tests to 50 transactions. However, we could not fix the size of
the smart contracts. To study the influence of contract size
we have calculated the rank correlation of the size of the
bytecode and the mutation score. For the combined killing
condition TxEvMethLimit, we found Kendall’s τ = −0.11
(p = 0.01, 2-tailed). This means that the mutation score is
not correlated with the size of the test. We also calculated
the correlation between the mutation score and the fraction
of bytecodes that were executed by the test and found the
correlation to be moderate: Kendall’s τ = 0.45 (p = 0.01,
2-tailed). The literature reports similar figures [6].
It is illustrative to compare our mutation scores with some
of the results from the literature. Javalanche [29] achieved 5%
– 63% for a set of seven Java programs of 2K – 95K lines
of code (LoC), and Tengeri et al. [32] report raw mutation
scores of 32% – 84% for a set of four Java programs of 31K
– 229K LoC. Rojas et al. [28] performed a mutation study
with students that tested 20 Java classes with 102 – 261 LoC,
which achieved mutation scores of about 69%, and they also
applied automated random testing tools which achieved scores
of 26% – 45%. It can be seen that our achieved mutation
scores are comparable to these studies. Mutation approaches
with manual tests sometimes achieve higher scores, but they
often require many iterations to improve the tests, which was
not feasible in our case. Our approach has the advantage that it
works with a high number of existing contracts, which enables
a rigorous analysis of our mutation operators. Moreover, we
did not find any literature with a mutation analysis of replay
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tests that also reports their scores and evaluates a reasonable
set of test programs. So there seems to be no equal work that
allows a fair comparison.
d) Efficiency of the mutation operators: Table IV shows
to what extent the mutation operators from Table II have been
successful. The first column gives the name of the mutation
operator. The second column indicates how many mutants
were not killed. The third column gives the number of mutants
that were killed. The fourth column gives the total number
of non-equivalent mutants. The last two columns give the
percentages related to the numbers in columns two and three.
TABLE IV
CONTINGENCY TABLE OF THE MUTATION OPERATORS AGAINST THE
MUTATION SCORE WITH THE TxEvMethLimit MUTANT KILLING
CONDITION.
Mutation Non-equivalent mutants Percentage
operator Not killed Killed Total Not killed Killed
AOR 2178 1039 3217 67.7% 32.3%
BOR 3549 2245 5794 61.3% 38.7%
ESD 5246 2595 7841 66.9% 33.1%
ITSCR 7796 4085 11881 65.6% 34.4%
JSRD 1866 1090 2956 63.1% 36.9%
LR A* 46 58 104 44.2% 55.8%
LR B 973 225 1198 81.2% 18.8%
LR I 1526 1089 2615 58.4% 41.6%
LR S 158 329 487 32.4% 67.6%
MORD* 921 143 1064 86.6% 13.4%
QRD* 1041 1761 2802 37.2% 62.8%
RAR* 3002 1158 4160 72.2% 27.8%
UORD 297 189 486 61.1% 38.9%
VDTSCS 2215 1050 3265 67.8% 32.2%
Total 30814 17056 47870 64.4% 35.6%
χ2 = 1759.6, df = 13, p < 0.001
Contingency Table IV shows that of the four Solidity
specific operators (marked with an asterisk) QRD* is the most
efficient. This is because subtle changes to the qualifiers,
such as removing the payable attribute from a method
completely breaks the contract. The standard LR S operator is
the most efficient operator overall. The reason is that strings in
Solidity are typically used for communication with the DApp
built on top of a smart contract. This means that even the
smallest change to a string will be detected by comparing
event parameters or method results. The MORD* operator
has the lowest efficiency (13.4%). This is because relatively
few historic transactions try to violate the access control
implemented by the modifiers. The RAR* operator also has
a low efficiency, for the same reason: few historic transaction
try to exploit bugs in address checking.
e) Using outputs in a mutant killing condition: The mu-
tation score for TxEvMethLimit reaches 35.7%, for TxEvMeth
30.2%, and for Limit 8.3%. These mutation scores are low
compared to state of the art approaches [27]. However, this
figure is useful as a baseline for other approaches that use
realistic tests instead of replay tests, and our aim was not to
achieve a high mutation score, but to evaluate the applicability
of our operators for a high number of contracts. Moreover,
even such a small score is helpful to show what kind of tests
are missing and what has to be done to improve the tests.
f) Using gas in a mutant killing condition: The contribu-
tion of the gas limit as killing condition is 5.5%, which seems
rather small, but since it can require a huge manual effort to
analyse the surviving mutant, even such a small fraction can
save hours or days of manual work.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We put the results in a broader context and formulate the
answers to the research question.
a) Discarding stillborn mutants: We believe that the
percentage of the generated mutants that do not compile was
relatively small and that it was acceptable in the exploratory
context. A production tool would have to implement more
sophisticated mutations and would therefore have more knowl-
edge of the semantics of smart contracts.
b) Discarding duplicate and equivalent mutants: A sim-
ple but state of the art approach has been used to address the
equivalent mutant problem. What we have not investigated
is to what extent gas usage can be leveraged to discard more
equivalent mutants. We suggest this as a topic for future work.
c) Mutation score: By leveraging the historic data avail-
able on the Ethereum blockchain we have been able to
generate tests that can be truncated to explore the relationship
between test strength and the mutation score.
d) Efficiency of the mutation operators: One of the
Solidity specific mutation operators was found to be more
effective in producing mutants that have a high chance of being
killed than the standard mutation operators. We take this as
an indication that further research is needed to develop more
sophisticated Solidity specific mutation operators. Another,
important aspect of mutation operators is to which extent
they can introduce common or severe bugs. To assess this
quality, we inspected the ability of our operators to introduce
known vulnerabilities which can have severe consequence.
The associated vulnerabilities as (specified by the SWC) are
shown in Table II. It can be seen that our specific operators
are concerned with more vulnerabilities and that they are
more severe compared to the standard operators. For example,
MORD* can trigger three different kinds of access control
related vulnerabilities, which would not be possible with the
standard operators.
e) Using outputs in a mutant killing condition: Compar-
ing the observable outputs of a transaction between the mutant
and the original kills most mutants.
f) Using gas in a mutant killing condition: We have
shown that using the gas consumption as a killing condition
can improve the mutation score and hence the effectiveness of
the mutation approach in general.
We are now able to answer the main research question: Our
Solidity specific mutation operators are more efficient than
the standard operators, and they also are able to introduce
more and more severe vulnerabilities. Table V shows that the
difference in efficiency is 3.3 percent point, which is modest,
but also statistically significant at (p < 0.001).
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TABLE V
COMPARISON OF ALL MUTANTS VERSUS THE MANUALLY ANALYSED
MUTANTS.
Mutation All mutants Manually analysed
operator Killed Total Killed Total
Mothra 35.1% 39740 41.3% 223
Solidity 38.4% 8130 48.1% 27
Total 35.6% 47870 42.0% 250
χ2 = 32.2, df = 1, p < 0.001
VI. LIMITATIONS AND THREATS TO VALIDITY
We first discuss some general threats to the validity of
our method and then some of its limitations based on the
recently published seven point checklist for mutation testing
in controlled experiments [27].
A. Threads to Validity
A threat to the validity of our evaluation might be that we
only consider a replay test suite that is less powerful than
other testing techniques, which might obtain a higher mutation
score. Although there are better testing techniques, the focus
of this work was not to find them, but to build a mutation-
based test quality assurance method that can also serve as a
baseline for other testing techniques of smart contracts.
To assess the effect of using a replay test suite we have
analysed by hand all 250 mutants generated for 5 carefully
selected smart contracts. Each contract took us about one day
to analyse, hence we had to limit the number of contracts
to a small number like 5. We used a stratified sampling
method taking one contract for the top 5% contracts by
mutation score, one contract from the bottom 5%, and one
contract each from 25 ± 2.5%, 50 ± 2.5% and 75 ± 2.5%.
In selecting the contracts from the five ranges, we tried to
avoid analysing the same type of contract more than once. We
analysed: the token DBToken10, the wallet MultiSigWallet11,
the auction NumberBoard12, the game casinoProxy13, and the
asset manager mall14.
Table V shows that the key statistics of the 250 manually
analysed mutants and all 47,870 mutants are comparable,
which suggests that the results we obtain for the 250 mutants
are representative for all mutants.
Table VI shows a contingency table for the mutation oper-
ator types versus the status of the different mutation results.
The Mohtra operators generate more semantically equivalent
mutants than the solidity operators, but overall the percentage
of semantically equivalent mutants is only 3.2%. This indicates
that semantically equivalent mutants do not inflate the base
line statistics by more than a few per cent points. The
second conclusion that can be drawn from Table VI is that
10https://etherscan.io/address/0x42a952Ac23d020610355Cf425d0dfa58295287BE
11https://etherscan.io/address/0xa723606e907bf84215d5785ea7f6cd93a0fbd121
12https://etherscan.io/address/0x9249133819102b2ed31680468c8c67F6Fe9E7505
13https://etherscan.io/address/0x23a3db04432123ccdf6ef4459684329cc7c0b022
14https://etherscan.io/address/0x3304a44aa16ec40fb53a5b8f086f230c237f683d
almost 100% mutation scores are possible with better tests.
A mutation score of 100% is not achievable with the current
implementation because it cannot detect the success or failure
of an internal transaction.
The MORD* operator helped us to discover a vulnerability
in one of the contracts, which we have reported to the owners
by way of responsible disclosure. The vulnerability consists
of a missing modifier onlyOwner on one of the methods.
TABLE VI
CONTINGENCY TABLE OF THE MUTATION OPERATOR TYPES AGAINST THE
RESULTS OF MANUALLY ANALYSING 250 MUTANTS.
Mutation Not Semantically Killed or Total
operator killed equivalent killable (count)
Mothra 0.0% 3.1% 96.9% 223
Solidity 3.7% 3.7% 92.6% 27
Total 0.4% 3.2% 96.4% 250
χ2 = 8.3, df = 2, p = 0.016
Another argument regarding the validity of our method
might be that it is not wise to kill a mutant only based
on a different gas usage since it could still be semantically
equal. However, we believe that a different gas usage is still
a valid reason to kill a mutant, because it represents a change
in the monetary cost of a transaction. Moreover, there are
other comparable cost factors, like energy consumption [14]
or execution time [22] that have been used as killing condition
in the past.
B. Mutation Testing Checklist
a) Mutant selection: The mutation operators consist of
the minimum standard Mothra set plus a number of experi-
mental Solidity specific operators. We have provided examples
to motivate the choice of operators in subsection II-A, but
this does not constitute proof that common errors in Solidity
programs are captured by exactly the chosen operators. We
leave such a proof for future work.
b) Mutation testing tool: We have implemented a be-
spoke mutation tool in JavaScript and the source will be made
available on GitHub. The appendix provides a detailed spec-
ification of the mutation operators. The mutation generation
tool uses uniform random selection of mutation operators and
operands.
Calls to block.timestamp do not cause non-
deterministic behaviour as all transactions in the tests
happen in the test environment at exactly the same time as
they happened historically. Calls to block.blockhash
may generate non-deterministic results, but we excluded
contracts that make such calls.
c) Mutant redundancy: We have used the state-of-the-art
method [17] to discard redundant mutants.
d) Test suite choice and size: We have used a relatively
large sample of smart contracts that are representative for
the entire collection of verified smart contracts available from
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Etherscan. This collection however, is probably not representa-
tive for the entire population of smart contracts. For example,
many smart contracts in this larger population are clones of
other smart contracts [10], but this is not the case for verified
smart contracts from Etherscan. From a uniform random
sample of 500 verified smart contract we have calculated the
normalised edit distance (NLD) of all pairs and found that less
than 1% of the pairs have a NLD of less than 20%, and less
than 5% of all pairs have a NLD of less than 60%. This means
that the vast majority of all pairs are different.
The tests are all of the same size, as each makes exactly 50
calls to a contract method. The tests have not been designed
as tests by developers of smart contracts, and can therefore
only be regarded as a baseline for real tests.
e) Clean program assumption: A limitation of this study
is that we rely implicitly on the clean program assumption
because we use existing smart contracts.
f) Multiple experimental repetitions: We have performed
the main experiment with a relatively large number of smart
contracts. In a second experiment, we have tried to improve the
test coverage by downloading double the number of historic
transactions (i.e., 100) for a uniform sub sample of 63 smart
contracts, but the results remain essentially the same.
g) Presentation of the results: The results are presented
aggregated over the entire sample of smart contracts, which is
larger than in most related research.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Smart contracts are programmed in domain specific lan-
guages such as Solidity. The learning curve is steep, and
the technology is young, so that developers are relatively
inexperienced. Therefore, it is important that at least the
tooling is up to date. We have proposed a mutation tool for
Solidity that developers can use to improve their tests.
We have evaluated the mutation tool on a large and realistic
random sample of smart contracts downloaded from Etherscan.
The tests used in the evaluation replay historic transactions
downloaded from Truffle-tests-for-free. Similar transactions
typically form the core of real handcrafted tests for smart
contracts, but these would be more comprehensive. Replay
tests form a baseline for mutation testing of smart contracts.
We propose a set of mutation operators for Solidity, which
includes the standard mutation operators from the Mothra set,
as well as four specific operators for Solidity. We showed that
our specific operators are on average a bit more efficient than
the standard Mothra operators. They are also able to introduce
more and more severe vulnerabilities, which is important to
assess the detection capabilities of the tests.
This shows that bespoke mutation operators are useful. The
average mutation score that we reported are not as good as
other state-of-the-art mutation tools because replay tests have
a limited bytecode coverage. Using the gas limit as a killing
condition has improved the mutation score by up to 5.5 per
cent points.
By way of future work, it would be expedient to repeat the
experiments with more realistic tests created by developers. It
would also be useful to study errors made by Solidity devel-
opers at scale to validate the mutation operators. Another area
of future work would be to use the gas limit on transactions
to detect equivalent mutants.
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APPENDIX - MUTATION OPERATORS
This appendix lists all mutation operators as sets of pairs.
The left component of the pair is replaced uniformly at
random by (one of) the right component of the pair.
AOR: {(/=,%=), (%=,/=), (=,{+=,-=,*=}), (+=,{=,-=,*=}),
(-=,{=,+=,*=}), (*=,{=,+=,-=}), (>>=,<<=), (<<=,>>=), (|=,{ˆ=,&=}),
(ˆ=,{|=,&=}), (&=,{|=,ˆ=})}
BOR: {(&&,||), (||,&&), (+,{-,*}), (-,{+,*}), (*,{+,-}), (/,%),
(%,/), (<,{>,<=,>=,==,!=}), (>,{<,<=,>=,==,!=}), (<=,{<,>,>=,==,!=}),
(>=,{<,>,<=,==,!=}), (==,{<,>,<=,>=,!=}), (!=,{<,>,<=,>=,==}),
(>>,<<), (<<,>>), (|,{ˆ,&}), (ˆ,{|,&}), (&,{|,ˆ})}
ESD: {(expression statement,true)}
ITSCR: {(identifier 1,identifier 2), (identifier 2,identifier 1)}
JSRD: {(break,{continue,true}), (continue,{break,true}),
(return,{throw,true}), (throw,{return,true})}
LR A*: {(0x...,{address(.),msg.sender,tx.origin,address(0),
address(this)}), (address(.),{msg.sender,tx.origin,
address(0),address(this)})}
LR B: {(true,false), (false,true)}
LR I: {(number,{number+1,number-1,0,1})}
LR S: {(’string’,’’)}
MORD*: {(modifier 1,{modifier 2, })}
QRD*: {(memory,{storage,calldata, }),
(storage,{memory,calldata, }),
(calldata,{memory,storage, }),
(public,{private,internal,external,constant, }),
(private,{public,internal,external,constant, }),
(internal,{public,private,external,constant, }),
(external,{public,private,internal,constant, }),
(constant,{public,private,internal,external, }),
(payable, )}
RAR*: {(msg.sender,{tx.origin,address(0),address(this)}),
(tx.origin,{msg.sender,address(0),address(this)}),
(address(0),{msg.sender,tx.origin, address(this)}),
(address(this),{msg.sender,tx.origin,address(0)})}
UORD: {(!, ), (++,{--, }), (--,{++, }), (-, ), (˜, )}
VDTSCS: {(declaration 1,declaration 2), (declaration 2,declaration 1)}
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